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1) INTRODUCTION 
 
 The article The Eyes and Ears: 1) Provides a brief analysis of the several parallel security 
organizations of the two superpowers of antiquity during the time when both were still at their prime;  
2) Discusses both internal and external security matters; 3) Analyzes separately the military and 
civilian intelligence; 4) Examines the role of the religious organizations, ‘heresies’ and security; 5) 
Discusses briefly the ways in  which the intelligence was obtained, analyzed, assessed and 
disseminated, and for what purpose; 6) Provides an overview of the successes and failu res and of the 
limits of intelligence: 7) Demonstrates some similarities between modern and ancient practices.  
 This study will use modern terminology and examples to describe the contents because it is 
written for modern audience. The general tendency among the ultraconservative branch of the 
Classicists tends to consider the use of modern terms such as network, system, professional, and secret 
service anachronistic because the terms are modern, but this is grave mistake when one analyses  
the phenomena for the modern audience. Anyone who understands anything about military practices 
and espionage understands that the Romans understood grand strategy, strategy, operational art of war, 
tactics and espionage even if they did not possess modern theoretical concepts for these. The evidence 
on the ground, narrative sources and military manuals all include material which would be categorized  
with these terms if one were to describe similar policies today. A good modern example of this fo lly  
would be to claim that the methods which are typical for the very recently invented term Hybrid  
Warfare would not have been followed in the past because the term is modern. The kataskopoi (spies) 
who were maintained by the state were a professional secret service even if the word Procopius (Wars 
1.21.11-16, Anecdota 30.1ff.) uses for those is spies. The reason why these ultraconservative 
Classicists fail to see the forest from the trees results usually  from the way they approach the material. 
It is all too typical for them analyze the words and language from the philo logical point of v iew, and 
not the content. This is actually very odd because one of the first things which is taught in translation 
studies is that when one translates a foreign language one should try to find the closest native modern 
word or term to describe what is translated. 
 
2) ROMAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN CA. 222-284 
 
The Beginning 
 
 The Roman intelligence gathering network was the creation of Julius Caesar and Augustus. 
Augustus’s own contribution to the system was to make it a formal part of the imperial administration 
which was maintained by the state. The intelligence gathering of the Roman Empire came to consist of 
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six basic components: 1) The bodyguards; 2) Troops quartered at the  Castra Peregrina/Peregrinorum 
(Camp of the Foreigners); 3) Regular military forces; 4) civ ilian policemen and paramilitary forces; 5) 
Relig ious control wielded by the emperor as Pontifex Maximus (High Priest); 6) informers. The first 
four organizations were used for both internal and external security functions while the numbers five to 
six served only the internal security needs.2 
 
The Bodyguards and the Military 
 
 Under Augustus and his successors the Senate became a mere rubber stamp for the decisions 
made in the household of the emperor. The most important matters of the state, including all details 
related to espionage, were d iscussed and analyzed in the Consilium (Council) of the emperor.  
The principal security concern of Augustus was to secure his own position against domestic enemies 
among the senatorial class. It was thanks to this that he set restrictions on the movement of senators 
and created the professional armed forces (army and navy). This monopoly on violence secured 
Augustus’s position against any possible usurpers. In addition to this, Augustus made the Praetorians 
and foreign bodyguards permanent units. The 300 Speculatores (Spies) formed Augustus’s personal 
bodyguards. All of the bodyguard units and regular soldiers could be used as undercover operatives to 
spy upon the populace and for any variety of other missions even if most of the really secret missions 
like assassinations or arrests were usually entrusted to the Praetorians and/or Speculatores. Each leg ion 
had a detachment of ten Speculatores to serve as spies and secret police. The statores were the regular 
military police. From the reign of Commodus (AD 180-193) onwards, the emperors were in the habit 
of creating new units of bodyguards for their own safety. The late Roman bodyguard units, the 
Protectores Domestici and Scholae both had their origins in the third century. During the third century 
the bodyguard units were commanded by one to three praetorian prefects. This made the praetorian 
prefects the most powerful persons right after the emperor and was the reason for the division of the 
office and also for the posting of the Legio II Parthica close to Rome at Alba by Septimius Severus 
(AD 193-211) in about 202.3  
                                                                 
2
 See SYVÄNNE (2015-.)  
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 SHELDON (2005) 143ff.; AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995), 109ff.; SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1, 159, 162-167, 224, 
416; SYVÄNNE (2017). It is often assumed by those who follow the ultraconservative version of the Classicist 
school that the Scholae were created by Constantine the Great because these are for the first time mentioned in  
the sources for his reign, but this results from our different approaches to the methodology and sources. I and quite 
a few other historians are ready to employ also sources overlooked by these ultraconservatives. These sources 
include later 4th or 11-12 th century sources which refer to the existence of Scholae for the third century, but  
the ultraconservative Classicists interpret all of these to be anachronistic because the sources are late. This 
approach fails to take into account three things: Firstly, the later sources had access to period sources which are no 
longer extant; Secondly, there are several sources that state the same; Thirdly, there also exists period evidence for 
the existence of the Scholae in the form of inscriptions, but these are interpreted to be officers’ clubs because 
Augustus was first to organize those (see e.g. LeBOHEC (1994) 159, 192; This fails to take into account the fact 
that the soldiers of the new elite bodyguard units could  be considered to have had the minimum rank of centurion 
like the Leones of Caracalla or the Evocati Augus ti (these ‘Augustus’s Reservists’ belonged to the Praetorian 
Guard. They were first created by Augustus who recalled back to service former veterans or allowed Praetorians to 
continue to serve as evocati after they had completed their regular service). It is in fact quite possible that  
the officers’ clubs called Scholae (schools) became to be associated with the new units of bodyguards thanks to 
the fact that the members  of the new bodyguard units attended those clubs. For additional details regarding  
the creation of the new bodyguard units (not included in Sheldon), see my studies which include further references  
to other studies and sources. 
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Fig. 1. Tombstone of Lucius Blassius Nigellio, a speculator of the Legio VII Claudia (Viminacium, Upper 
Moesia, Mod. Kostolac, just east of Belgrade). The tombstone shows him on a mission in his official transport. He 
is protected by a guard armed with a spear who appears to be a beneficiarius. The beneficiarii were detached 
soldiers who performed special missions of espionage. On the basis of this, it is probable that the beneficiarii 
operated under the speculatores of their units (© Dr. Ilkka Syvänne 2014) 
 
Internal Security 
 
 The creation of the Principate meant the loss of freedom of speech for the Roman aristocrats 
and people. The opinions and actions of the people and in particular of the upper classes were 
controlled through a variety of means: 1) secret agents, police forces/firemen (Vigiles) and military  
forces (Urbaniciani) operated by the Urban Prefect; 2) censorship of the literary works and other 
works of art; 3) p rivate informers (delatores) who were encouraged to come forth with rewards;  
4) soldiers or bodyguards disguised as civilians;4 5) relig ious institutions which were apparently 
controlled personally by the emperor through his office as Pontifex Maximus.  
 Since the emperors retained a monopoly on the office of Pontifex Maximus, it is very probable 
that they ran a relig ious spy network through their pontifices (priests). The evidence for the relig ious 
police operated by the Pontifex Maximus is scanty and based solely on the continuous reports made by 
the soothsayers, oracles, seers and astrologers to the imperial authorities regarding the questions made 
by the upper class Romans on questions of possible political importance. This would also have been 
the reason for the imperial opposition to all new religious cults like Christianity. It was only when  
the emperors thought that the new cult could be controlled and used to obtain the goodwill of the 
populace that it was accepted – when doing this the emperors usually (but not always) also took into 
account the possible reaction of the conservative elements within the senatorial class. It should be 
stressed, however, that the soothsayers etc. were not religious police like the Persian magi.  
The emperors were not interested in relig ious purity – but primarily in personal security.5  
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 SHELDON (2005) 150ff. 
5
 The role of the Pontifex Maximus in this is uncertain, but since Augustus considered it necessary to include its 
powers among his own it is probable that it did have some role in this – after all it meant that the emperors were 
the High Priests of Rome and its religions. The sources are full of references to the instances in which  
the consultation of an oracle or soothsayer etc. for the wrong reasons caused the death of the person who did that. I 
include here only a sample of examples: Tacitus, Annals 3.22, 13.22, 16.14; Dio (Loeb ed. p. 330, p.336); 
Ammianus 26.4.4 with Zosimus 4.1, PLRE 1 Maximus of Ephesus and Priscus 5 with additional sources therein; 
Ammianus 29.1.5-29.2.28; And further references to the laws against magic in OGDEN (2002), esp. pp. 280ff. 
See also SYVÄNNE (2017) and SYVÄNNE (2015-.).   It was also possible to use the religious establishments for 
the dissemination of secret information so that it was hidden as a prophecy to hide the name of the informant. For 
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 Augustus also created public post to communicate with provincial officials which included 
very important intelligence dimensions. Thanks to the public post Augustus was able to obtain accurate 
intelligence reports in a timely manner and to disseminate official propaganda where needed. From  
the reign of Hadrian onwards the public post was governed by the Prefect of the Vehicles.  
The messengers of the public post travelled on wagons and carts all the way up to the person to whom 
they were to inform so that the messenger could be interrogated in person for additional p ieces of 
informat ion. In addit ion to this, there existed a separate network of horse stations for military messages 
which needed to be delivered fast by mounted couriers. According to the sixth century historian 
Procopius (Anecdota 30.1ff.), the couriers (kataskopoi, the spies, were in late Roman times called as 
the Agentes in Rebus) could be expected to travel at a speed of about 200 – 250 Roman miles (300 –  
375 km) per day. If the information was not adequate, the emperors were in the habit of sending 
investigators to obtain additional informat ion. The Romans used secret ciphers to hide the content of 
the message from the prying eyes when necessary. The Romans did also use a system of guard towe rs 
placed at strategic locales along the frontiers to transmit messages of approaching enemy forces by 
using fire or smoke signals, or by using mirrors. It was possible to send an advance warning of  
the invasion quickly with this system, but the means of delivery meant that such messages could not 
contain many details.6  
 The most notorious intelligence gathering organizat ion of the early emperors was the unit of 
Frumentarii. They were housed in the Castra Peregrina/Peregrinorum (Camp of the Foreigners) on 
the Caelian Hill in the city of Rome. The Frumentarii were used as messengers, spies and assassins. 
The Frumentarii consisted originally of the soldiers who were in charge of purchase and distribution of 
grain (frumentum) for the troops so that some members of the corps were always located in Rome 
while others were with their unit or on a mission, but from the reign of Domit ian (AD 81-96) onwards 
they were increasingly used to spy upon the army, administration and populace so that in the eyes of 
the people they eventually became synonymous with the abuse of power. The Castra Peregrina had 
received its name from the Peregrini, but it is not known who these mysterious men were. The usual 
guess is that the Peregrini consisted of all of those soldiers who had been detached to Rome from their 
mother units so that they consisted of the Frumentarii, Speculatores (housed in the same camp), and of 
any other detached soldiers, but it is also possible that there existed a separate group of Peregrini who 
served as a sort of secret service.7  
 
Foreign Intelligence 
 
 In my opinion it is probable that these Peregrini formed the mysterious group of Roman spies 
who operated in foreign lands disguised as traders, but it is even more likely that the Peregrini 
included also actual foreigners who served as spies in their own countries under their Roman handlers 
(the Speculatores). There is no doubt that the best agents were always those who were native to their 
own lands and who spied against their own countrymen – they were the traitors who served  
the Romans. It was and is very difficult for a foreigner to pass as a native, hence the need to recruit 
foreigners and hence the name Peregrini.8  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
further details, see esp. SYVÄNNE (2017) and SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Dio’s referral (56.23, also in OGDEN (2002) 
281 to Augustus’ ban on divination is enlightening for the reasons behind his thinking. Augustus did not himself 
believe in divination, but made the ban anyway. Those who consulted the oracles, astrologers and seers to ask the 
wrong questions (e.g. how long the emperor would live or would he become an emperor etc.) were naturally 
considered enemies of the state because of the questions they made. This would not  mean that there would not 
have been superstitious emperors too who really believed in such magic, but Augustus’ example shows us that  
the initial and main reason for all of the above was purely internal security.  
6
 SHELDON (2005) 143ff.; PATTENDEN (1983) 258-299; It is unlikely that the speed of the couriers would 
have changed from the early Principate to the sixth century, because the means of travel for the kataskopoi,  
the horse, remained the same.  
7
 SHELDON (2005) 250-260; BAILLIE REYNOLDS (1923) 168-189; SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vol. 1, Caracalla.  
8
 Examples of earlier use of foreigners: SYVÄNNE (2009) 9-23. 
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 The only source to mention the existence of the spies (kataskopoi) maintained by the Roman 
state since ancient times is Procopius (Anecdota 30.1ff., esp. 30.12-14).  
 According to Procopius: “And the matter of the spies is as follows. Many men from ancient 
times were maintained by the State, men who would go into enemy’s country and get in to the Palace of 
the Persians, either on the pretext of selling something or by some other device, and after making  
a thorough investigation of everything, they would return to the land of the Romans, where they were 
able to report all the secrets of the enemy to the magistrates. And they, furnished with this advance 
informat ion, would be on their guard and nothing unforeseen would befall them. And this practice had 
existed among the Medes also from ancient times. Indeed Chosroes, as they say, increased th e salaries 
of his spies and profited by this forethought. For nothing [that was happening among the Romans 
escaped] him. [Justinian, on the other hand, by refusing to spend anything at all on them] blotted out 
from the land of the Romans [even the very] name of spies  …”9 
 Unfortunately Procopius (Wars 1.21.11-16, Anecdota 30.1ff.) fails to state precisely how this 
spy network was organized. The magistrates appear to mean the Roman leadership in the collective 
sense led by the emperor, but one may make the educated guess that the spies in question probably 
consisted of the Peregrini and Frumentarii collectively because they were housed in the same camp in  
Rome and probably also of the Speculatores. From the third century onwards the spies in question are 
likely to have included also the Protectores Domestici. The Agentes in Rebus (see later) replaced  
the Frumentarii in about 284. It was thanks to the ability of the spies to penetrate the palaces that  
the Romans and Persians sought to use disinformation and s ecrecy to hide their plans. 
 The Romans obtained intelligence from foreign lands through a variety of means: 1) military  
expeditions; 2) by sending spies (included diplomats etc.) and scouts and patrols (Exploratores) over 
the border; 3) by interrogating prisoners; 4) by questioning foreign embassies and traders and travelers; 
5) by interrogating their own traders and merchants; 6) from intelligence reports sent by their foreign 
allies; 7) from Greek geographical works or narrative histories. The regular in telligence gathering 
operations along the frontiers were controlled by the local governors and their staffs, but there were 
occasions when the imperial government sent its own operatives to obtain additional informat ion. 10  
 
Civilian Police Forces 
 
 The last but not the least of the security arms of the emperor were the civ ilian police forces, 
which went with different names. The civilians were responsible for the regular police work under  
the guidance of the governor and soldiers detached for this duty. The civilians were required to man 
guard stations; patrol the roads and rivers; exact tolls and customs; and follow the orders given by  
the detached soldiers. The civilians were thereby made responsible for the intelligence gathering along 
the roads, coasts and frontiers against domestic and foreign enemies, but with the difference that they 
apparently did not conduct any active operations across the border.11 
 
The Failure of the System 
 
 Rose Mary Sheldon correctly points out that the internal security system of the Roman 
emperors was not a great success despite the vast amounts of money spent. The principal problem was 
that the reliance on the security forces made the emperors entirely reliant on the loyalty of these very 
                                                                 
9
 Procopius Anecdota 30.12-14. See also NECHAEVA (2004) 137-147, available online at academia.edu. Note, 
however, that it is probable that Procopius was correct in stating that Justinian scaled down the intelligence 
services. The reasons for this were probably the so-called eternal peace between Rome and Persia and economic 
problems.  
10
 SHELDON (2005) 143ff.; SYVÄNNE (2004); SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vol. 1, Caracalla. For the use of diplomats 
as spies and special operatives, see also NECHAEVA (2012); SYVÄNNE (2004) and Nachaeva include further 
references to important studies of A.D. Lee. 
11
 FUHRMANN (2012) esp. civilian policing 21-87; ISAAC (1990); SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vol. 1, Caracalla.  
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same forces. And when the internal security failed to function properly, the external security suffered 
as well. The best proof of this is the third century crisis from ca. 235 until 284. 12  
 And, this was not even the whole extent of the failure of the internal security apparatus. One 
of its main functions was to prop up the official religion and to prevent the spreading of foreign cults 
like Christianity. In fact, the persecution of Christians had the exact opposite result. It increased  
the popularity of Christianity among the downtrodden populace amidst all the crises 13. The cult of 
martyrdom in part icular contributed to its popularity.  
 
3) THE LATE ROMAN EMPIRE 284-450 
 
Background 
 
 Between the years 284-324 two remarkab le emperors Dioclet ian (284-305) and Constantine 
(306-337) the Great corrected the failings of the earlier security services. Dioclet ian was well p laced to 
do this because he was the commander of the bodyguards (Comes Domesticorum). He created  
the Tetrarchy to satisfy the wishes of his generals, but in truth his reforms were cosmetic – Diocletian  
retained the real power in his own hands. The highest ranking generals became emperors and the 
names of the units and officers were changed and offices were mult iplied to bribe the personnel (each 
emperor had to have his own administration), but the basic structure of the organization remained  
the same with the exception that Magister Offiorum (Master of Offices) became the head of most of 
the security organs14.  
 
Internal and External Security, and the Civilian and Military Intelligence 
 
 There existed no clear divisions between internal and external security and civilian and 
military intelligence gathering so that it was possible for the civilian and milit ary administrators to 
collect civilian, military, domestic and foreign intelligence. It is therefore not surprising that  
the Romans used both civilians and soldiers as their special operatives and as diplomats/spies.15  
 The sources prove that the emperors  were usually direct ly involved in the intelligence 
gathering and special operations like assassinations and that they were often assisted in this by  
the members of the Consistory and by those who were called to take part in its sessions, and/or by their 
closest trusted friends. The sources also prove that the generals and high ranking civilians like  
the praetorian prefects, vicars and governors conducted active intelligence gathering operations and 
special  
 
 
 
                                                                 
12
 SHELDON (2005) 270-271. Sheldon is certainly correct in stating that the emperors spent vast amounts of 
money on their security apparatus, which consisted of the army, units of bodyguards, public post and spies. These 
are known to have consumed most of the state revenue. The main drains for the Roman taxes were the army and 
security apparatus, imperial court, food handouts for major cities like Rome, and the civil servants. By far  
the most expensive of these were the first. 
13
 Good examples of this Christian tendency can be found e.g. in the PLRE 1 Saturninus Secundus Salatius 3 
(reign of Julian) and BIRLEY (2000) 177-180. 
14
 See e.g. SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.1 (esp. pp. 2-3, 177-181, 189, 419). There were no real differences in the 
organization between the bureaus (or ministries or departments) of the second, third and fourth centuries because 
their functions remained the same and even the office of the Magister Militum appears to have been created in  
the third century. A fuller discussion can be found in the SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.1 (pp. 2-3, 181, 189 with 
notes). 
15
 See e.g. Ammianus, 16.9, 17.5.12, 17.5.15; AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 220-221, 228-230; SYVÄNNE (2015-
.). For the use of diplomats as spies and special operatives, see also NECHAEVA (2012). 
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operations (both in Roman territories and abroad) and that they used military men (protectores and 
regular armed forces), civ ilians and professional spies (presumably the Agentes in Rebus possibly with 
the Protectores) for these missions as needed.  
 The generals had in their staffs both natives and foreigners that they could use for these 
special missions. It is quite possible or even probable that the Peregrini became part of the new 
Agentes in Rebus at the same time as the Frumentarii were officially disbanded (in truth only renamed 
as Agentes in Rebus). The sources also prove that the late Romans took seriously the importance of 
counter-intelligence operations, and that they compartmentalized their informat ion, used double-
agents, and used ciphers and other means to hide the contents of their messages.16  
                                                                 
16
 Ammianus, 15.5 (esp. 15.5.21ff.), 18.3.8, 18.6.8-18.7.6; Zosimus, 3.7, 4.38.1-39.5; CTh 6.24.1; Procopius, 
Wars 1.21.11-16, Anecdota 30.12-14 (see above); AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 221-226; SYVÄNNE (2004); 
earlier example in SYVÄNNE (2009a)  5-16; PLRE 1 Charietto; Some examples of later East Roman practices to 
obtain double-agents in NECHAEVA (2004). I disagree with the conclusion of AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 233, 
that the system of spies recorded by Procopius would not have existed in the fourth century on the basis of  
the evidence they present. Their evidence demonstrates the exact opposite. They note that the spies (speculatores) 
of the Praetorian Prefect Strategius and local military dux reported back to their superiors separately that  
the Persian ruler was facing trouble at the other end of the Empire in 355 (Ammianus 16.9.2-3). We can equate 
these speculatores with the kataskopoi of Procopius. It is unfortunate that we lack precise details of how these 
kataskopoi/speculatores were organized. It is possible that the military  dux and the Praetorian Prefect employed  
a different set of spies so that the dux employed military speculatores (or detached protectores) belonging to his 
units and the Praetorian Prefect the Agentes in Rebus, or that both employed spies belonging to the same 
organization, the Agentes in Rebus.  In fact, since both the Agentes in Rebus and Protectores  were officially under 
the Magister Officiorum, one can actually consider that the latter is true even when the dux would have employed 
the Protectores and the Prefect the Agentes. What is certain, however, is that the Praetorian Prefect employed  
a person who is likely to be an agens in rebus to obtain intelligence from across the Euphrates in 355. See PLRE 1 
Clematius 2. The problem with this is that Clematius had been initially dispatched by Constantius II to carry  
a letter to the Prefect, and it is probable that in this case Clematius was used as a special operative by Constantius. 
AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 220-221, suggest that the Prefect just used Clematius only because he was there.  
In my opinion this is unlikely because Clematius had been dispatched by the emperor and it was after this that  
the Prefect started to seek peace with Persia which must have resulted only from the imperial order carried by 
Clematius. Clematius was clearly an imperial special operative in charge of observing the situation like so many 
other agentes, notarii and protectores dispatched by the emperors Regardless, it is still very probable that  
the persons that the prefects used for intelligence gathering missions consisted mainly of the agentes because there 
were always agentes in their staffs. This is also noted by AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 220, but they fail to draw 
the obvious conclusion from this. The same legislation noted by Austin and Rankov on page 220 also proves that 
there were agentes in the staffs of the vicars, governors and military  duces, which means that  
the spies/speculatores of Ammianus are likely to have consisted of the Agentes in Rebus. In fact, Procopius’ 
referral to the speed of travel of the kataskopoi proves quite clearly that they were agentes. Despite the fact that I 
consider Christopher Kelly’s monograph (2004), esp. 206-210 with endnotes) to be a good introduction for readers  
into the workings of the Roman Empire, I disagree in the strongest possible terms with his conclusion that  
the Agentes  in Rebus cannot have functioned effectively as “secret service or internal security police force” 
because there were too few of them and they needed to travel vast distances and carry vast amounts of information 
(p. 207). He bases his claim on a set of assumptions like on a modern estimate of their numbers and not on period 
sources, which are quite specific about the fear that the agentes caused when they acted as special operatives of 
the emperor and kept watch over the different branches of the government together with the notarii and how they 
abused their vast powers. Kelly even quotes some of these, but only for the reason to claim that their claims  
cannot be true (p. 207). This fails to take into account the actual security needs and what the period sources state. 
The placing of these spies in the staffs of all important officials and officers was enough from the point of view of 
internal security because it took a while for a plot to be formed. For example, the success of the revolt of Julian 
against Constantius II did not result from any slow speed of couriers or because there would not have been 
adequate numbers of spies in Julian’s staff. It resulted from Constantius’ foolish decision not to trust the reports 
and recommendations that he had been given. In short, in most cases the failures of the security services resulted 
from incompetence or corruption of some individuals or from the faulty interpretation of the intelligence received. 
[See SYVÄNNE (2004) with SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.1 with the index] This is only to be expected when humans  
are involved. Modern organizations with their vastly improved technologies and communications can also make 
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 The overlapping of the duties was meant to ensure greater security for the emperor.  
 
The Civilian Secret Service 
 
 At the very beginning of his reign Diocletian d isbanded the Frumentarii to gain the support of 
the upper classes, but this was only a cover up for the creation of even more powerful secret service 
called the Agentes in Rebus (General Agents) who acted as: messengers; inspectors; spies who read  
the mail of others; controllers of movement of people and goods and information; policemen; 
undercover agents; informers; spies abroad; diplomats, and as assassins. Despite being officially  
soldiers like all civil servants of late Rome, the Agentes in Rebus were in pract ice civilians. The second 
civilian branch of the secret service were the Notarii (scribes) who performed similar missions as the 
Agentes. The Notarii were ideally placed to spy upon their superiors. The official head of both of these 
organizations was the Magister Officiorum (Master of Offices) who also became the official 
commander of all bodyguard units after 324. In practice, however, the Agentes and Notarii could be 
given independent missions or be detached to serve under other officials and officers. Unsurprisingly, 
both of these organizations became corrupt. The posting of the Agentes and Notarii in the various 
staffs of various officials and officers resembles the Soviet use of political commissars. They were to 
keep an eye on their superiors.17  
 The powers of the civilian secret services were severely curtailed by Valentinian I (365-375) 
in 365. The key event was the execution of former agens in rebus Diodorus together with three men  
dispatched by the Vicarius of Italy to arrest an unnamed military Count who then made a complaint 
about this (Amm. Marc. 27.7.5). This signaled to all high ranking officers that they could now enrich 
themselves without any fear as long as they would not attempt to usurp the power.18  
 The Agentes in Rebus and other civilian organizations could no longer investigate the generals 
for corruption. Th is is not surprising because Valentinian I’s position as emperor was entirely  
dependent on the support of the top brass. This was very unhappy decision for the military  
effectiveness of the armed forces. When the massive corruption of the officers was added to  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
quite bad mistakes! The curtailing of the powers of the agentes and other civilians vis-à-vis the top brass by 
Valentinian I in 365 was the main problem and not the number of agentes or the distances covered.  
17
 SHELDON (2005) 261-265; SYVÄNNE (2015c); SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1 (esp. 12-13, 180ff.) with 
forthcoming vol. 2 and previous note. 
18
 This event was told by Ammianus precisely because it signaled to the top brass that it was possible to ignore the 
agentes in rebus. Contrary to what some historians think, single events do have importance beyond their normal 
importance when these events give a signal what can or cannot be done. It is for this reason that single persons or 
groups of persons are used to make an example so that one would not need to resort to the use of more violent 
methods. In this case, however, the message was negative. It  is was after this that Ammianus went on to list the 
cases of corruption that caused wars and revolts. The top brass abused their powers without fear of being punished 
with dire consequences. See Ammianus 27.7.4-5 with 27.9.4-5, and 30.4 and 30.9.1 with the indexes in the Loeb 
ed. of Ammianus referring to the cases of corruption in North Africa, Britain and elsewhere for the reigns of 
Valentinian I and Valens 365-378. Roman Empire was never corrupt free, but the level of corruption among the 
top brass reached such levels that the Romans had never before seen anything like it. Libanius’ Orations 47 (ca. 
389-392) and 2 (ca. 380/1) are good examples of the results of the massive corruption of the top brass. The level 
of corruption among the top brass under Constantius II was still tolerable and did not cause the same kind of 
massive problems that can be detected under Theodosius. It was not without reason that Ammianus referred to the 
well-to-do soldiers of Constantius II at a time when he wrote during the reign of Theodosius I. At that time the 
soldiers had already been fleeced poor by their officers. Thanks to the fact that Ammianus wrote in a dictatorship, 
he could not point his finger to culprits and the problem directly but had to use contrasts to criticize his own times. 
More detailed discussions can be found in SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1, esp. pp. 390-391 and vols. 2-3 (the 
publisher has both in line to be published). In other words, I agree with Ramsay MACMULLEN’s (1989) basic 
argument that the late Roman Empire was badly affected by massive corruption, but I disagree with him on the 
timing of the problem. I date it to have taken place only after 365. I also disagree with him on the results of this 
massive corruption. The field army sizes did not diminish, but  actually increased thanks to the fact that more 
poorly motivated and equipped soldiers were needed to face the enemies in the field. The overall cost of all of this 
was ruinous and contributed to the willingness of the populace to change rulers.  
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the corruption of civilian officials, the cost was just too great for the taxpayers. Valentinian III’s (425-
455) Novella 28 (11 Sept. 449) shows how weak the Agentes had become by mid-fifth century. He 
legislated against the avarice of the judges so that the privileges, subsistence allowances and other 
emoluments of the principes of the Agentes could be protected. The secret service had become too 
weak to protect itself and this at a time when internal security was more important than ever thanks to 
the presence of the barbarian Federates inside the borders!19  
 Despite the general weakness of the Agentes in Rebus after 365, there were some famous and 
remarkable individuals who made all the difference. The best example of this is the fame of the agens 
Palladius (Socrates 7.18-19 with the PLRE1 Pallad ius 5). Theodosius II (408-450) and the Roman top 
brass used Palladius as their trusted courier to carry the most important messages in the early 5th 
century. This man was able to reach the eastern frontier in three days and then return back to  
the capital in three days.  
 The first signs of the alienation of the population took place under Theodosius I (379-395) in  
380. The cit ies of Thessaly and Macedonia asked the Goths to assist them against the imperial taxmen 
dispatched by the Emperor. Libanius’ Orations 47 (ca. 389-392) and 2 (ca. 380/1) prove beyond doubt 
that the corruption of the top brass had reached such levels under Theodosius that the situation was fast 
becoming unbearable. The military protection rackets were led by the magistri who acted as godfathers 
for their subordinates. Theodosius legislated against the corruption, but was clearly unwilling to 
enforce it because he relied on the support of the generals. The situation got only worse under 
Theodosius’s successors. The corrupt security apparatus could not secure the safety of the Empire 
when the military effectiveness of the native troops suffered from corruption and when the generals 
relied more and more on foreign mercenaries and when the civilians started to see their own armed  
forces as their real enemy. It required a great balancing act by the rulers to keep the different 
powerbrokers in check. In the east the emperors were successful, but in the west they were not.  
The desperate Arcadius was even forced to seek help from Persia to keep the generals in ch eck.20  
 Despite its moralizing tendencies Salvian’s On the Government of God (written ca. 440-451) 
is a key text when one attempts to analyze the causes of the fall of West Rome (esp. 5.4ff.).  
The populace preferred the life in the wilds as Bacaudae/Bagaudae (self-governing bandits) or they 
fled to the areas governed by the Goths or Vandals. The Germanic barbarians were more law abid ing 
and less morally corrupt than the imperial tax collectors, the armed forces, and Roman upper classes. It 
is no wonder that the internal and external security apparatuses proved powerless in the face of this. 
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 See the previous note. 
20
 Zosimus, 4.31-32; Libanius, Orations 2 and 47; SYVÄNNE (2015) 71-102. In this context I need to correct one 
very important mistake made by a number of ultraconservative Classicists which is to claim that the foreign 
component would not have risen dramatically in the course of the fourth century and that it would have decreased 
by the sixth. The only portion of this claim which is true is that the foreign component decreased in the East after 
Theoderic I had taken his Ostrogoths to Italy in about 489. Here it suffices to note that those who think that  
the number and importance of the barbarians in the Roman armed forces did not increase after 378 should answer 
the following questions: Why it was that Stilicho was known for his employment of Huns and other barbarians? 
Why it was that Stilicho needed Alaric against the East Romans and then against the usurper Constantine III and 
why he was forced to obtain the services of so many other barbarians against the usurpers? Note that Alaric was  
a king of the Goths and his followers were called Goths despite the fact that his army included also other tribes 
and even Romans, which means that the vast majority of his followers were Goths. Similarly, there are no good 
reasons to doubt the claims in the sources that Stilicho really called the tribes that invaded Gaul to do so because 
this same ploy was used also by earlier emperors. Summary of the sources can be found PLRE 1 Stilicho and 
PLRE 2 Alaricus. Similarly why it was that the West Romans were unable to oppose Alaric and his Goths after 
they had foolishly killed the families of the barbarian soldiers and had refused to accept the services of Sarus 
(another Gothic or Alan leader)? Why it was that the East Romans faced so many troubles in dealing wit h  
the Gothic Gainas (note that the sources call his followers Goths despite the fact that these were supposed to 
consist of regular praesental forces) that they were forced to admit him and his Goths inside Constantinople? Why 
it was that Aetius was forced to rely on Huns and then on other barbarians when he fought against the Huns? Why 
it was that the East Romans had to recruit Isaurians to oppose the Germanic and Alanic element in the fifth 
century? These examples abound and it is a great folly to claim that all of the sources that we possess would be at 
fault with their statements. 
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The central government recognized the problem and legislated against the corruption (e.g. NVal 1, 4, 
6.3, 7.1-3, 10), but every new layer of inspectors or changes in the organization only added to the cost 
as they too demanded their bribes. Therefore the real cause of the fall of West Rome was the presence 
of Germanic barbarians inside the Empire, which made it possible for the disaffected to flee  
the clutches of the imperial security machine. The only thing that kept the Roman commoners from 
flocking to the security provided by the barbarians was the relig ious divide between  
the Catholic/Orthodox Romans and Arian Germans. The population has to have a will to resist and 
only the Catholic faith gave them that. East Rome did not face similar troubles because the presence of 
the Gothic Federates became a problem only after the murder o f Aspar in 471 and because the harsh 
way of life among the Huns and Persians offered very few attractions for those who had tasted  
the Roman way of life. The Federates in the east were more closely integrated into the regular state 
apparatus, which meant that these did not offer any place of refuge for those who disliked the imperial 
authorities. It should be noted that the presence of the barbarian kingdoms inside the Empire also 
weakened the economic potential of the Empire by denying its tax collectors access to the resources 
located in those areas.21  
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 In addition to the sources mentioned see, Procopius, Wars 2.28.25ff.; Paulinus, Eucharisticus 496ff.; 
SYVÄNNE (2015b) Paulinus’ text offers a very good view into the mindset of the Gallic youth at the time. Two 
of his sons, who belonged to the upper class and cannot be considered to have been destitute, decided to seek their 
fortunes among the Gothic settlers because they yarned for freedom. I consider the evidence presented by Salvian 
and Paulinus to be of utmost importance because both explain quite well why some of their contemporaries failed 
to oppose the barbarians and why so many sought employment and better life among them. It is not known why 
the Persian way of life was so unattractive, but one may make the educated guess that the control exercised by  
the magi over the daily lives of the inhabitant made it quite unbearable. The control of these magi extended to 
every part of human existence because each village had one priest to exercise religious control over its inhabitants. 
See below. It appears to be a common misunderstanding among at least some of the Classicists that the instance in 
which Priscus met one happy Greek merchant from Viminacium among the Huns would mean that the Romans in 
general would have been eager to seek liberty among the Huns. In order to remove this false perception I need to 
quote Priscus at length (Priscus frg. 11.232-235, 11.368-372, 11.407ff. the excellent English tr. by BLOCKLEY 
pp. 259, 265, .267-269 with my additions in Italics inside parentheses): “… While we were discussing these 
things, some of Attila’s men came and said that neither Vigilas nor ourselves were to buy any Roman prisoner, or 
barbarian slave, or horses, or anything else except for food until the disputes between the Romans and Huns had 
been settled. [This shows how the Roman and barbarian prisoners wanted others to ransom them when they had 
been captured by the Huns] … The builder of the bath had been taken prisoner at Sirmium, and he hoped to gain 
his freedom as a reward for his inventive work. But he was disappointed and fell into greater distress than slavery 
amongst the Scythians. For Onegesius made him bath attendant, and he waited upon him and his followers when 
they bathed. [This clearly proves that this man did not want to live among the Huns .] … As I was waiting and 
walking about before the circuit wall of the palace, someone, whom I took to be a barbarian from his Scythian 
dress, approached me and greeted me in Greek, saying “khaire” (“Hello”). I was amazed that a Scythian was 
speaking Greek. Being a mixture of peoples, in addition to their own languages they cultivate Hunnic or Gothic or 
(in the case of those who have dealings with the Romans) Latin. But none of them can easily speak Greek, except 
for those whom they had taken prisoner from the sea coasts of Thrace and Illyria; and whoever met them could 
easily recognize them from their tattered clothes and filthy hair as persons who had fallen into adversity. [Note 
that all other Greeks in Hunnic lands were prisoners in flighty cloths. There were no real turncoats or refugees. 
Life among the Huns was not appealing.] This one, however, was  like a well-cared-for Scythian with good 
clothing and his hair clipped all around. … He laughed and said that he was a Greek and for purposes of trade had 
gone to Viminacium, the city in Moesia … When the city was captured by the barbarians, he … was assigned to 
Onegesius … in the division of spoils. … Having proven his valour in later battles against the Romans and  
the nation of the Akatiri, … he had won his freedom. He had married a barbarian wife and had children, and, as   
a sharer at the table of Onegesius, he now enjoyed a better life than he had previously. …” In sum, this instance 
does not prove that the Romans in general would have wanted to live amongst the Huns. On the contrary it proves 
that all East Romans in the Hunnic territories were prisoners-of-war and not refugees or turncoats as in the West 
and even this single exception accepted Priscus’ counterarguments (frg. 11.454ff.) accurate even if he at the same 
time said that the Roman authorities were ruining it by not following the precedents (i.e. the massive corrupt ion 
was ruining it). The option of reinstating universal conscription to expel the barbarians was not an option available 
for the late Roman emperors or for the Roman warlords who ruled the West, because it would have been very 
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 The late Romans continued to use the civilians for intelligence gathering as regular police 
forces and as paramilitary forces. They operated under the governors and local military commanders 
and detached soldiers just as they did before.22 
 
The Imperial Bodyguards, the Protectores Domestici and Military 
 
 Constantine the Great and his successors made additional changes to the military  
organization. The Praetoriani were disbanded in 312 and replaced by the Protectores Domestici 
(possibly the successors of the Speculatores) and Scholae. This reorganization meant that  
the praetorian prefects had no longer permanent units of their own, but only such as were designated to 
them by the emperor so that they could carry out their duties. This does not mean that the praetorian 
prefects would not have performed internal or external security functions – they did – but it meant that 
the commanders of the new bodyguard units were now the persons responsible for the personal safety 
of the emperor and all that it entailed.23  
 The official commander of all bodyguards was the Magister Officiorum, but since he was 
usually a civilian, the bodyguards were in practice usually commanded by the Comes Domesticorum 
(Count of the Household) or comites domesticorum (counts of the household). The Protectores were 
the principal intelligence gathering arm of the armed forces. Its members served as: staff officers and 
bodyguards in the court; officers of the Scholae and other units; staff and intelligence officers for 
generals; diplomats, special operatives and assassins. The Protectores were the ancient equivalents of 
the modern Soviet NKVD/KGB/Spetsnaz forces.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
dangerous for them to arm the populace when it was very unhappy with their rulers. The other reason for this was 
the resistance of the senatorial class against conscription on their lands [e.g. MATTHEWS (1975/2001)]. In 
contrast, in 238 the Italians could still be mobilized to fight against the professional Roman army led by  
the barbarian emperor Maximinus  Thrax (235-238). The contrast could not have been greater. Now the Germanic 
kingdoms offered for the Romans a chance to escape the oppression of the Roman Empire. It should be noted that 
the views that I have adopted here go against the current consensus opinion among the ultraconservative branch of 
the Classicist school (which in my opinion is based on faulty approach to the sources). I base my conclusions on 
various sources and on the events on the ground and not on some fashionable modern theories. However, my 
views are actually not that far away from the opinions adopted by the historians before the 1980s. I am just taking 
the arguments much further than ever before by stressing the importance of the hearts and minds in the fall of 
Rome. In order for any Empire to survive it needs willing defenders and these were now lacking. A good modern 
example of the importance of this is the collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European Empire. The contrast 
between east and west was just too obvious for any security apparatus to hide. All empires need willing 
defenders!One should not overlook the evidence presented by the Christian sources, when these are actually 
backed up by the events on the ground. There was no massive native rising against the barbarians (or barbarian 
ruler like there was in 238). Most of those who opposed the barbarians belonged to the senatorial class (note e.g. 
that some of the cities of the east saw the Goths as their protectors against the taxmen in 380) and the result of 
their racist attitudes and opposition to the raising of taxes and conscription on their lands was the collapse that 
took place during the reign of Honorius which led to the creation of the barbarian kingdoms that then offered  
the people a place of refuge. The Germanic kingdoms were eager to receive these refugees because the extra 
inhabitants brought economic prosperity. We should not draw from this the conclusion that the refugees of today 
would automatically bring similar outcome because modern European countries are required to provide a living 
for the refugees and we are here also dealing with persons who come from an alien culture and not with native 
refugees as in the late Roman times. East Rome avoided similar problems because Arcadius was married to  
a daughter of a Frankish general Bauto so that his son Theodosius II could be considered to have been a half or 
quarter barbarian (we do not know whether Bauto was married to a barbarian or Roman woman). It was primarily 
thanks to this that the East Romans integrated their barbarian warriors more fully into the society until the murder 
of Aspar changed the situation. More detailed argumentation for all this can be found in SYVÄNNE (2015-.) and 
MATTHEWS (1975/2001) e.g. 277-278. 
22
 SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1, 49-55. 
23
 SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.1, 254ff.  
24
 FRANK (1969); AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 225-226; SYVÄNNE (2015-.) for the vol. 1, see the index); KGB 
Alpha Team Training Manual (Boulder 1993).  
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 The standard sources of intelligence for the military were the same as before: 1)  
the information provided by the civilians, traders, travelers and civilian spies; 2) the informat ion 
obtained from military spies, scouts, land patrols and naval patrols, and sentinels/guards posted on 
guard towers and walls; 3) the information provided by allies. The regular military forces, including 
the Vigiles and Urbaniciani, continued to be used for internal security missions just as before. The late 
Romans retained all the same systems of transmission for the messages and intelligence reports. There 
were towers placed at strategic locales along the borders which were  used to transmit  messages with 
smoke signals, fires and mirrors; The military couriers transmitted messages by using relays of horses; 
The slow moving postal wagons were still used for the less urgent messages. On campaign  
the commanders sometimes reconnoitered/spied in person, but it was more usual for them to obtain 
informat ion from their spies, scouts, patrols and vanguard.25 
 Despite the fact that the Roman military and civilian intelligence apparatuses with their 
overlapping duties usually performed as expected, the late Roman period includes several examples of 
gross incompetence that caused massive damage to the security. The most famous of these instances is 
the mistaken report given by the vanguard/skirmishers (procursatores) of the emperor Valens just prior 
to the battle of Adrianople in 378 (Amm. Marc. 31.1.3ff.). The end result was the destruction of  
the Roman army with its emperor. Most of these instances took place during the reigns of Valentinian, 
Valens, and Theodosius I, which may mean that the quality of the military spies and scouts and 
vanguards (procursatores) was lower during those years thanks to the wide-spread corruption of  
the top brass. The emperors may also have been aware of the problem because Valentinian chose to be 
his own scout in 368 (Amm. Marc. 27.10.8ff.) and Theodosius his own spy in 391 (Zosimus 4.48). In  
both cases the emperors’ suspicions were correct. The Huns were also able to surprise the Romans in 
395 and so were the Persians in 440. It is probable that the latter failure were caused by human 
mistake, because the East Roman intelligence gathering network performed relatively well in other 
cases possibly as a result of the East Roman efforts against corruption after 395. 26 All intelligence 
organizations are liable to make mistakes because the interpretation of the evidence is always subject 
to human error. 
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 SYVÄNNE (2004) summarizes Vegetius, Peri Strategikes and Strategikon.  
26
 SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vols.3-4. The efforts of the East Roman government to curb the military corruption (and 
corruption of the curiosi/agentes) can be seen in their legislation (e.g. Codex Theodosianus 6.29.10, 7.1.27-32, 
7.7.4-5, 7.11.1, 7.4.30, and 7.4.35-36). The East Romans did not pay the same amount of attention to the 
corruption of the civilian administration (e.g. Synesius’ Letter 73 with SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.3, Appendix 3), 
but it should be noted that the problems started really with the rise of military corruption after the year 365.  
The West attempted to follow similar policies, but with less success. The East Roman armies were clearly more 
effective than the West Roman ones, but part of the reason for this was that the East Romans were far more 
successful in their incorporation of the Goths and Alans into their army. The main reason for this was that 
Arcadius’ government did not follow the same kind of racist policies  as Honorius thanks to the fact that Arcadius 
was married to the daughter of Bauto who was a Frank.  
Fig. 2. Shield emblem of the Protectores Domestici Equites in the 
Notitia Dignitatum. One would expect that the corps which had  
a pink shield with hearts and angels, and emperors embracing each 
other to be always loyal to their ruler, but this was obviously not 
always the case. 
 
(© Dr. Ilkka Syvänne 2014) 
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Emperor’s S pecial Operatives  
 
 The sources also prove that the emperors were in the habit of employing the heads of  
the imperial bedchamber (Praepositi Sacri Cubiculi), masters of offices, praetorian prefects, 
bodyguards, and members of his Consistory for any security duties even if th is in most cases meant 
only cases of internal security, but this was not the entire extent of the organization employed by  
the emperors, because they could basically choose to use anyone that they trusted for any mission they 
desired. The best example of this are the vast powers of investigation (included even the use of torture 
and execution) granted to the notorious Paul the Chain who was only a lowly notarius. There were also 
occasions in which all main branches of the security services were ordered to work together for  
a common purpose. The highest ranking civilian admin istrators, military officers, friends of  
the emperor, and members of the aristocracy were also quite eager to act as informers for their own 
benefit so there was no shortage of informers and accusers.27  
 
Christianity and State Security 
 The making of Christianity state relig ion was the most pivotal of the changes instituted by 
Constantine. Constantine and his immediate successors remained high priests of the Roman Empire so 
that they could retain the support of the traditionalists and could obtain the above-mentioned 
intelligence, but from the reigns of Gratian and Theodosius I onwards the emperors considered this 
unnecessary. It was now considered more important to obtain information of the Christian heretics, 
because most emperors did not tolerate any dissenting views. The churchmen of the emperors’ favorite 
faction were used to control other priests and populace. These churchmen could even use military  
forces in the performance of their duty (Socrates 4.15; Sozomen 4.21).  
 It should be noted, however, that the informat ion the emperor and admin istration could obtain 
through the network of b ishops and priests was limited. If the dissident had the support of significant 
sections of the society, including members of the secret service and military, the emperors could not 
achieve their aim. The best example of this is the ability of St. Athanasius to hide from the Arian  
churchmen and authorities. On top of that, the most influential religiou s persons could form their own 
intelligence gathering networks inside the imperial admin istration. The best example of this is  
the intelligence gathering network of St. Ambrose who managed to plant his own spies inside 
Theodosius I the Great’s Consistory (St. Ambrose, Letter 51.2).28 It is probable that these persons 
consisted mostly of the devout Catholics who were quite prepared to disclose their secrets to  
the Bishop. This problem became less important after Theodosius I. Theodosius’s harsh measures 
against the pagans and heretics ensured the ultimate victory of the Catholic/Orthodox faith.  
The churchmen were obviously always divided in their religious views, but the measures adopted by 
the emperors to promote the Catholic/Orthodox faith were still suff icient from the point of view of 
internal security. The religious dissents lacked the strength to challenge the majority opin ion when it  
was supported by the state. From the point of view of internal security it became more important to try 
to stem the most violent actions of the fanatic Christians against the relig ious minorit ies, but these 
incidents were not a threat to the emperor and therefore not a high priority. 
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 For example: Ammianus, 14.5.6ff., 14.10.4, 14.11.21, 15.5.12, 16.8, 20.2.2; AUSTIN, RANKOV (1995) 221-
226. 
28
 Despite the fact that we lack precise knowledge of how St. Ambrose obtained his intelligence it is probable that 
he must have organized his large household and Church staff in such a manner that all confidential information 
flowed secretly and efficiently into his hands, hence my term network. His informants and sources would 
obviously not have been considered officially sanctioned spies, but we should still remember that all officially 
sanctioned spies would also have maintained their own networks of informal and formal sources. This official 
system is not that different from the systems maintained by some powerful individuals in the past (e.g. by Julius 
Caesar and the private informers of the emperors, see my academia.edu material with the forthcoming books). It is 
quite clear that St. Ambrose was in a position to order priests and monks to gather information by various means 
in the name of the Church and the sources also prove that he was well informed of all events that took place in  
the Empire. 
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 The different factions of Christians were not the only groups that had infiltrated the imperial 
administration. The emperors were usually ready to hire talented persons regardless of their faith, 
which meant that there were also pagans in the admin istration. These pagans actually formed a cabal to 
restore the ancient religion and worked actively to achieve this already during the reign of Constantine 
the Great. The most serious of the plots was formed in about 354 by Julian and his philosopher friends 
against Constantius II, which resulted in the death of the latter. It is probable that Julian in his turn was 
killed by the Christians belonging to the bodyguards. His successor Jovian was also killed by  
the bodyguards, but his death was caused by infighting among the military fact ions for primacy. 
However, the pagans remained unsatisfied with the situation. The gravest of the subsequent pagan 
conspiracies was the so-called Great Pagan Conspiracy of the year 371/2 against Valens. The resulting 
purge of the pagans removed the pagan threat in the east forever. The final nail in the coffin of  
the pagans in the west was the victory of Theodosius I over the pagan general Arbogastes in 394. After 
this, there existed no real threat of major pagan conspiracies to restore the pagan faith among  
the imperial bodyguards. All emperors were expected to be Chris tians.29  
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 Ammianus 22.1.1-2, 28.1.1ff., 29.1.5-29.2.28; Libanius Orations, 18.118, 18.21-27; Nazianzus, Oration 4 
Against Julian 1.47-48; Tougher in Julian the Apostate, ed. and comm. S. Tougher (Edinburgh 2007), 38-39 ; 
SYVÄNNE (2015a); SYVÄNNE (2015c) with SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1. esp. 387-388 with index, vols. 2-3. It 
is also quite obvious that Jovian was murdered even if modern research has not understood this. Ammianus 
(25.10.12.1ff.) gives three theories for the death of Jovian: Jovian had died as a result of a recently plastered 
bedroom; Jovian’s head had swollen as a result of asphyxiation caused by carbon monoxide; he had died as   
a result of overeating. However, we are here once again dealing with a situation in which Ammianus was not free 
to disclose the truth in plain language but had to use roundabout means to do this. When one does this it becomes  
apparent that Jovian died as a result of a conspiracy.  Firstly, Ammianus noted that Jovian’s death resembled that 
of Scipio Aemilianus because no investigation was ever made into the cause or circumstances of their deaths 
(Scipio’s death was considered to have been a murder). Secondly, he stated that Jovian’s father Varronianus  
(former Comes Domesticorum) had learnt what would happen long beforehand from a dream, and had told this to 
two of his confidential friends, but had then died before he could meet his son. I would suggest that the ‘dream’ 
represents a way in which Ammianus could convey to his readers the information that Varronianus had learnt of 
the plot to kill Jovian, but had then been murdered before he could meet his son. One or both of Varronianus’ 
confidants must have belonged to the conspiracy. Thirdly, Valentinian, the future emperor and the man who had 
survived the revolt in Gaul against Jovian, had conveniently been left behind at Ancyra so that he could not be 
implicated in the matter. Fourthly, Ammianus (26.1.1) himself notes the dangers of disclosing the truth in the 
same context of events. In sum, there is no doubt that Valentinian’s supporters murdered Jovian and then raised 
him on the throne. There is one possible later attempt made by a pagan against emperor in the east. HOLUM 
(1982/1989) 82, has noted in his ground-breaking monograph that the Neoplatonist Damascius’ Life of Isidore 
suggests a possibility that Lucius, who was a pagan and Magister Utriusque Militae,  attempted to murder 
Theodosius II in his palace. According to the story told by Damascius, on one day Lucius went into the imperial 
apartments with the intention of killing the emperor, but the attempt failed because Lucius was unable to draw his  
sword from the scabbard despite attempting to do that three times. After this he fled. The reason for this was that 
Lucius supposedly saw a giant and burly woman standing behind the emperor with her protective arms around 
him. As noted by Holum, the woman undoubtedly represented the Fortune/Tyche of the emperor, who prevented 
the killing. The real life woman could have been the emperor’s sister Pulcheria. It is impossible to know whether 
this was just wishful thinking by Damascius or a real event in which Lucius could have attempted to take revenge 
against an emperor who had sacked his patron Anthemius (and possibly executed because he disappears from  
the sources?) but then failed to carry out his intentions. If true, it is unlikely that even if  the murder would have 
been a success that the pagans could have reinstated their dominance because by then the vast majority of the 
population, army, barbarian Federates and upper classes were Christians. For further details, see the forthcoming 
SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol.3. As regards Alan CAMERON’s (2013), I am not convinced by his arguments that there 
would not have existed a pagan attempt to restore their position in the late 4 th century. His claims are based on  
a set of assumptions, which do not stand closer scrutiny. I give here only some examples, because to do otherwise 
would require a book length commentary. Firstly, the assumption that the closer to the period the source is the 
likelier it is to be true is based on a completely faulty approach to the sources – sometimes the exact opposite is 
true. In modern context, it suffices to note that the later authors are actually likely to be closer to the truth because 
the Secrecy Acts usually limit the availability of evidence for the period authors. Secondly, the set of assumptions 
which attempt to refute the paganism of Arbogastes are completely faulty. There are no good reasons not to accept 
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 The above instances prove that the religious convictions – the blind faith in their own cause - 
were far more powerful forces than all the laws and security services put together. These relig ious 
persons worked for the benefit of their own relig ion and sabotaged the workings of the security 
services whenever this was in their interest. In light of this, it is not surprising that the emperors 
attempted to make certain that all of their subjects followed the religious doctrine followed up by them. 
It proved impossible to follow the policy of religious freedom, because the empire was full of relig ious 
bigots at all levels of the society who opposed all tolerance towards the different faiths. This left  
the emperors with only one option which was to choose which  version of the Christian faith they 
would follow. In the end, the emperors chose to follow the most popular version of Christianity,  
the Catholic-Orthodox faith, because this gave them the support of the vast majority of the society –  
a wise choice from the point of view of internal security. The support given by the emperors after 
Valens to the Catholic/Orthodox faith was also important for another reason: it enabled the emperors to 
widen the gap between the Catholic population and Arian Germans in a situation in which the imperial 
authorities had lost the support of the populace as a result of their complete moral corruption. By 
associating themselves closely with the Catholic/Orthodox faith, the emperors acted as the protectors 
of the faithful against the heretics – even if there is no definite evidence for this it is possible that this 
was a cynical move in a situation in which the emperor’s representatives were fleecing the populace 
mercilessly, but a wise policy move from the point of view of internal and external security. It should 
be noted, however, that the emperors continued to employ persons of other faiths even after they had 
chosen to follow the Catholic doctrine. Th is was particularly true of the barbarian soldiers because  
the emperors needed their services. The only exception to the rule were the Jews who from  
the beginning of the fifth century were subjected to ever increasing persecution probably as a result of 
the influence of bigoted Catholics on the emperors, which led to alienation of the Jewish population.30  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Paulinus’ and Orosius’ statements that he was. It is uncertain whether he was the son of Bauto and even if he was  
it does not follow from this that Arbogastes would not have been a pagan. It was entirely possible for the pagans 
(e.g. Athanaric and Fravitta) and Arians (Christian Goths) to rise to high positions under Theodosius I despite the 
latter’s vehement support of Catholic faith. The fact that both armies at the battle of Frigidus included Christians 
and pagans does not mean that Arbogastes’ army would not have presented a very real danger for the Christians. 
The view adopted by all Christian sources is a proof enough. They clearly saw a very real danger even if  
the Christians shared the same cultural background with the pagans – anyone who is familiar with the Christian 
doctrine also knows that the ancient philosophies have had very direct influence on the development of its 
doctrines. The pre-battle ceremony, the taking of the haruspices (it is probable that Cameron is correct to call it 
such), conducted by the pagan Praetorian Prefect Flavianus in the full view of the army can have taken place only 
with the acceptance of Arbogastes and his puppet emperor Eugenius. It is also certain that Flavianus did indeed 
conduct the pagan ceremony in question because the Christian sources are unanimous that he did. Such pagan 
ceremony was a clear break with the standard military  practices of the time. The fact that the Christian ceremonies  
had been mixed into the older military practises does not mean that these would still have been pagan ceremonies. 
All military ceremonies were now Christian ones, which is well shown by the practices followed by Theodosius I. 
It is also very likely that Flavianus’ pagan ceremony lowered the morale of the Christian soldiers in Arbogastes’ 
army to such an extent that some of them deserted to the other side during the following night (after their 
commanders had been bribed), and sealed the fate of the usurper and his pagan supporters. For the sources, see 
PLRE 1 Arbogastes, Eugenius 6, Flavianus 15.    
30
 The Jews were accepted to serve in the security organs until April 22, 404. It was then that the imbecile 
Honorius gave an Edict to remove all Jews and Samaritans from the School of Agentes in Rebus (CTh 16.8.16). 
The order to expel the Jews from the Agentes in Rebus and Elite forces was repeated by Honorius on March 10, 
418 (CTh 16.8.24). No reason for the decision is given, but one may hazard a guess that the bigoted Catholic 
priests may have had a role in the decision. None of the sources even hints that the Jews would have been disloyal. 
Their loyalty is actually proven by the fact that those in service were allowed to complete their terms of service. 
Similar intolerance was shown by the East Roman government when it was led by Pulcheria. There were also 
restriction placed on pagans, but in practice these were accepted into service. See e.g. PLRE 1 Fravitta, PLRE 2 
Marcellinus 6, Litorius with SYVÄNNE (2017). The entire chapter, which is a summary of the evidence 
presented, is at odds with the ultraconservative consensus opinion among the Classicists, but is closer to the views 
held by the previous generations of researchers even if it looks at the evidence from different perspective – namely 
from the perspective of internal and external security. It is a historian’s  job to see past the fashionable trends and 
not follow those blindly. 
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4. PERS IAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 224-450 
 
Ardašīr  I’s Creation: the Zoroastrian Empire 31 
 
 The Sasanian society with its administrative and military structures was the creation of  
the founder of the dynasty Ardašīr  I. He belonged to a priestly family. It is therefore not surprising 
that Zoroastrian clergy were to play a pivotal role in the new Empire. Zoroastrian faith was the law of 
the land and its priests were used to control all civ ilian and military activit ies. Ardašīr  created also 
regular civilian and military secret services, but their members were also required to be devout 
Zoroastrians. The Zoroastrian priests played the same role in Persia as the mullahs in modern Iran.  
 The Roman sources make it clear that the second cornerstone of Ardašīr ’s new Empire was 
its Achaemenid (Persian/Parsig) propaganda. Ardašīr  represented himself as the rightful heir of  
the Achaemenids and as the restorer of the former Persian Empire. This required military campaigns.32 
 The third cornerstone was the deal made between the Sasanians and the Parthian magnates 
according to which the highest offices of the Empire were reserved to the latter.33 The Parthian warrior 
nobility could be kept happy only by showing them proper respect and by conducting offensive 
military campaigns that brought prestige to the warrior class.  
 In sum, the ruler’s safety depended on the support of the Zoroastrian clergy and Parthian 
nobles, which could be obtained only through the persecution of other religions and with successful 
wars. 
 
Civilian Intelligence Gathering Network 
 
 The extant texts give us a relatively good overall pictu re of the multilayered civilian  
intelligence gathering network created by Ardašīr  I. The only problem is the identity of the “King’s 
Eye”. 
 According to the Letter of Tansar (24-26), all men were trembling with fear because Ardašīr  
had informers and spies everywhere. The text consoles the readers with the claim that the innocent and 
upright men had nothing to fear because the ruler chose as his eyes and informers only those who were 
trustworthy, obedient, pure, devout, learned, religious and abstinent in worldly things. In other words 
Ardašīr  required all of his agents to be relig ious men on the grounds that these were supposed to be 
upright persons – a silly proposition as we shall see.  
 The Armenian and later Muslim sources suggest that the  hazāruft/chiliarchos (Prime 
Minister/Commander of Thousand) was the principal spy master of the šāhānšāhs. This was not his 
only function. He oversaw the peasantry, economic activ ity and collection of taxes, and was the 
commander of the bodyguards and the head of the administration while also being a Priest or High 
Priest – in some cases even the Chief Magus/ mōbadh of all clergy. It is therefore quite possible that 
the hazāruft /chiliarchos was the so-called King’s Eye (the Civ ilian Spy Master), the other possible 
alternative being the Chief-Scribe. This collection of offices meant that some hazārufts like Mehr-
Narseh were ab le to amass all power in their hands – a situation which spelled trouble for the rulers. 
And this was not even the full extent of the mixing of the religion with the positions of power.  
The evidence suggests that all local generals and governors were also required to be Zoroastrian priests 
                                                                 
31
 With the exception of the Roman and Armenian sources, the other sources  used here for the analysis of the 
Sasanian intelligence gathering apparatus have been written during the Muslim period. All of these contain 
material from the Sasanian times that is missing from the other sources and are therefore very valuable. It is  
the duty of all self-respecting historians to use these and not discard this evidence solely on the basis that it is late 
as is all too often being done. For a fuller discussion of the sources and methodology to be followed, see my 
Bahram V Gōr SYVÄNNE (2015) and the previous notes. 
32
 Some historians do not accept the Achaemenid connection, but I do. The Roman sources are quite unanimous  
and the numerous organizational similarities between the two support the same conclusion.  
33
 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between the Persian monarchs and Parthian nobility, see 
POURSHARIATI (2008). 
125 | P a g e  
or at least thoroughly indoctrinated in its central doctrines. The same sources also prove that  
the Persians required all of their spies and double agents, foreigners included, to be indoctrinated in  
the Zoroastrian faith. It is obviously clear that some of the agents were undercover initiates so that they 
could work below the radar, because all knew fu ll well that the magi were all spies and were also 
treated as such by their enemies. 34 This indoctrination of the populace and office holders in  
the Zoroastrian faith clearly resembles the methods followed in modern Iran and Soviet Union – 
dictatorships which are based on relig ion/ideology tend to follow the same princip les.35 
 We have also every reason to believe that the inspectors/judges/counselors, who were all 
members of the clergy, were all members of the secret service organized under the Chief Judge who 
doubled as Chief Magus/mōbadh. These priests were attached to every province, local court, and larger 
unit of the army like in modern Iran. All legal actions and the making of any kind of treaty required to 
be confirmed by a member of the clergy so there was almost nothing that escaped their attention.  
The scribes were also used as spies just like the Roman Notarii. Firdawsī’s referral to the use of  
the scribes as envoys, witnesses , false deserters, and spies confirm this. Unsurprisingly, the scribes 
were also priests by training.36 
 According to Mirkhond (p.281)37, Ardašīr  introduced a system of inspectors who operated 
under the Head Postmaster. Ardašīr  expected to hear the daily intelligence briefings from his Head 
Postmaster every morning immediately after he had woken up. The inspectors were placed everywhere 
to keep an eye on the general mood of the populace and to report all matters of interest every morning. 
The inspectors sent their reports to their superiors, the local postmasters/intelligence officers, and they 
in their turn dispatched matters of importance forward every morning to the Head Postmaster and  
the King of Kings. Mirkhond claims that Ardašīr  expected to be able to learn  of the events that had 
taken place in the farthest corners of his Empire within a period of about 24-48 hrs. It very unfortunate 
that he fails to explain how the system operated, but considering the speed of delivery the only possible 
explanations are the use of: fire/smoke signals as used by the Achaemenids;38 relays of courier pigeon 
housed in towers spread throughout the Empire in the same manner as was used during the Caliphate. 
See the illustration of the pigeon tower (source: Jane Dieulafoy, Perse. Paris 1887). It should be noted 
that the skilled rebels could cut off the information flow to the ruler simply by posting horsemen 
throughout the countryside to intercept all messages (Firdawsī, p.762).  
 Mirkhond (p.281) also notes how Ardašīr  sough t to ensure that his ambassadors were loyal 
and honest, and reported accurately what had been said. The reason for this was that inaccurate 
messages could result in unwanted wars. The ambassadors were legalized spies 39 and appear to have 
worked under the direct control of the ruler and hazāruft. 
 
                                                                 
34
 Ghazar P’arpe’i’s History of the Armenians, tr. by R. Bedrosian. New York (1985) available online at 
rbedrosian.com (partial tr. also in Elishe, 251ff.) Part Two, 20ff., or 60ff., or g37ff., [104ff, esp. 104-108], 32ff. 
(esp. 32), g59ff. (esp. g59-g62); Ferdowsi, Shahnameh, Partial English tr. D. Davis  (New York 2007), e.g. pp. 
721, 724 (Complete translations and editions available online); Elishe, History of Vardan and the Armenian War, 
tr. by R.W. Thomson. (Cambridge, London 1982), 192ff. esp. 202; The History of al-Tabari Vol. V, tr. C.E. 
Bosworth. New York (1999); Vol. XII. tr. by Y. Friedmann (New York 1992), i.861, 869. 
35
 See e.g. WARD (2009) 211ff. 
36
 SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vol.1; Ferdowsi e.g. 724, 730-34, 739-40, 754-55, 760-62; Agathias, 2.26.2-5; DARYAEE 
(2009) 53.  
37
 MIRKHOND (1713). 
38
 For Achaemenid practices, see DVORNIK (1974), 23-34.  
39
 The envoys/diplomats/ambassadors were (and are) legalized spies in the sense that they are allowed to enter 
foreign territory with the acceptance of its government and all of them had (and have) the duty to report back all of 
their observances and to gather as much information as possible for later use by their employers.   
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Nizam al-Mulk40 claims that the ancient system of agents and informers used by the Persians was 
so efficient that if anyone wrongly took so much as a chicken or a bag of straw from another that the 
ruler would know about it and could have the offender punished. This is c learly an exaggeration, 
because it is clear that the local agents and judges would have punished the minor offences on the spot 
so that only the most important matters were reported further up in the chain of command. Nizam 
states also the obvious: The informers were expected to be men who were completely above suspicion 
and self-interest; They were direct ly responsible only to the King of Kings, who in his turn was 
expected to pay them a monthly salary.  
 
Military Intelligence Gathering  
 
 Military intelligence gathering naturally exploited the above-mentioned civilian sources to 
obtain information of matters of importance, but the information provided by the sources suggest that 
in addition to this the ruler and the military employed spies of their own.  
 As has already been noted Persia employed undercover agents abroad most of whom were 
disguised as merchants or as envoys. These appear to have consisted of two types of military or 
civilian agents: a) those dispatched by the central government for some specific purpose; b) those who 
were operated by military officers along the frontiers.  
                                                                 
40
 Nizam al-Mulk, 66-67. 
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 As regards the former, the sources demonstrate that the  šāhānšāh sometimes operated their 
own spies. For example, Bahrām V Gōr used his own operative to co llect information on Turks in 422. 
This was even more important when the rulers faced internal threats. In those cases they used their own 
trusted men who usually consisted of the courtiers/noblemen, scribes or chief-scribes who were present 
in their court. My own educated guess is that we should equate the noblemen of the court with the 
pushtighban Guard, which  would therefore have been the successor of the Achaemenid institution of 
Kins men cavalry (the ruler’s personal bodyguards).41  
 Ammianus gives us some very important details of the espionage along the Persian border. 
His account shows that the Persians employed spy networks along their borders which were organized  
and operated by the local military commanders and governors and who were then directly a nswerable 
only to the King of Kings even if it is likely that they also informed their immediate superiors,  
the viceroys, on a need to know basis.42 
 The most detailed accounts of the way in which the Persians conducted intelligence gathering 
operations during their military campaigns are late, but undoubtedly relevant also to the earlier period. 
One of the most detailed accounts is Tabari’s (i.2214ff.) description of the battle of al-Qadisiyyah43. 
He shows (i.2244) that the Persian supreme commander Rustam was also an astrologer and priest.  
In light of the above, this is to be expected44. In the course of the campaign, he used all the standard 
means of gathering information: 1) The commander of the vanguard was ordered to capture Arab 
prisoners for interrogation (i.2253-54; the commander of the vanguard was undoubtedly the local spy 
chief); 2) He dispatched a spy inside the Muslim camp (i.2291); 3) He reconnoitered the enemy 
positions in person (i.2267); 4) He used the regular spy network (i.2255) but was not  aware of a double 
agent (i.2252-53). In sum, it appears probable that the Persian field armies had two persons in charge 
of intelligence gathering: a) the overall commander; b) the commander of the vanguard. Both had at 
their disposal professional spies and special elite forces that could be used as spies and scouts. 
 
The Achaemenid Connection 
 
 Since we know that Ardašīr  modelled many facets of his administration after the Achaemenid  
system, the best proof of which are the similarities, one may make the educated guess that he divided 
his intelligence services into separate organizations according to the same model 45: 
1) King’s personal bodyguards under the Commander of the Bodyguards (Pushtigban-salar who 
performed also spying/security functions around the court); the Achaemenid Kinsmen.  
2) King’s other bodyguards (including the 10,000 Immortals) who served under  
the hazāruft/chiliarch. 
3) The eyes and ears of the king operating under the mysterious ‘King’s Eye’. It is possible that  
the King’s Eye should be equated with the hazāruft. 
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 E.g. Tabari (i.864, i.996) and Ferdowsi (pp.717-720, 724, 730-34, 739-40, 754-56, 760-62, 768-69) and 
SYVÄNNE (2015) 88. 
42
 Ammianus 18.6.16 with SYVÄNNE (2015-.) vol.1 (361ff.); PLRE 1 Tamsapor and Nohodares with  
the addition of Ammianus, 17.5.12. See also NECHAEVA (2014). Ammianus describes also the use of Roman 
Protectores in counter intelligence operations and also the indoctrination process used by the Persians. 
43
 For the battle, see SYVÄNNE (2014).  
44
 At the time the spy organizations were divided into two factions, which do not concern us here. For these 
questions, see Tabari (I.2252-53) with Pourshariati. 
45
 For the Achaemenid system, see: DVORNIK (1974) 23-34. I agree with Dvornik that Herodotus’ (1.114) 
account of the young Cyrus the Great proves that there existed separate offices: Builder of the Houses, 
Commander of the Bodyguards, King’s Eye (Spy -Master), and Postal Master. This means that the Commander of 
the Bodyguards (chiliarch), King’s Eye, and Postal Master were all separate offices. Nicholas Sekunda’s   
The Persian Army 560-330 BC (1992) provides a very useful synthesis of the Achaemenid army and it s different 
units. This monograph is recommended reading for those who want to obtain more information regarding  
the Achaemenid armed forces. For the offices mentioned general information can be found in N. Garsoîan’s  
translation The Epic Histories of Pawstos of Buzand (Cambridge 1989) and CHRISTENSEN (1936) and 
SYVÄNNE (2015-.) Vol. 1, 97-129. 
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4) The scribes under the dibheran mahist. It is possible that we should equate the dibheran with  
the King’s Eye. 
5) Couriers/spies operating under the Postal Master. 
6) The relig ious police consisting of the various branches of the clergy but so that the herbeds 
headed by Chief-hērbedān were responsible for the religious terror (Tabari i.991). What is notable 
about the Sasanian system is that practically all leading members of the admin istration and military  
were simultaneously priests. The likely reason for this is that religious indoctrination was considered 
essential part of the education just like in modern Iran.  
7) The military and civilian spies along the frontiers controlled by generals who reported direct ly to 
the monarch. 
 The above-mentioned instances suggest that powerful hazārufts like Mehr-Narseh could usurp 
control of all of the security organs, which means that the division of the security apparatus and 
intelligence gathering into separate organizations was not always successful as a precaution. It is 
therefore no wonder that the rulers needed their own separate unit of bodyguards and used their 
military retinues, trusted friends, scribes and other persons as their spies separately from those 
controlled by the hazāruft or other spy masters. Most importantly, most of the rulers also maintained 
tight control over the military intelligence, but we should not forget that the members of the military  
were similarly indoctrinated as the rest of the society so that the soldiers did not feel any loyalty 
towards any ruler considered a “sinner”.46 
 
5) THE TWO INTELLIGENCE GATHERING S YS TEMS COMPARED  
 
 Despite the similarities of the administrative systems, which probably resulted from  
the Roman imitation of the Persian system, there existed fundamental differences between these.  
 The Persian society, with its laws and its security apparatus, was entirely based on Zoroastrian 
faith. With the exception of some rulers like Ardašīr  I,  Šāpur I and Xusrō  I, most of the Persian 
šāhānšāh were hostages of their clergy. The magi had so much power that they could pressure  
the weak rulers to do their bidding, which meant the persecution of religious minorit ies and offensive 
wars with neighbors. Those rulers who did not follow their wishes are invariab ly called as sinners in 
the extant sources and practically all of them met violent end at the hands of the magi and nobles.  
The religious persons in the security apparatus did not feel any loyalty towards such sinners. There was 
very little chance of the Zoroastrian faith spreading abroad without violence because it placed so many 
restrictions on individual freedoms. It is not a coincidence that the relig ious laws still govern every 
aspect of life (even the waging of warfare) in the Middle East even today.  
 In contrast, the Roman emperors were never hostages of their priests. They could choose their 
own religious views. The Roman laws, society and way of life were not based on any particular 
religion even if the emperors in the end chose to follow the mainstream Catholic -Orthodox doctrine.  
 Most of the Persian kings of kings were also hostages of their feudal magnates. The warrior 
caste was similarly bellicose and promoted war with neighbors, and if these wishes were not met,  
the ruler faced trouble. The rulers could suppress the nobles and magi temporarily with their own 
forces, but it was extremely rare for such rulers to die a natural death as for example the deaths of 
Yazdgerd I and Bahrām V Gōr show.  
 In contrast, the Roman emperors could appoint whomsoever they wished to any office – the 
religious views and birth could have an impact on the choice, but pagans, Catholics, Arians and 
foreigners did find their place in the emperor’s service. Their principal risk was a usurpation attempt 
by an ambitious general/emperor with large numbers of troops at his disposal.47 Most of the security 
measures were meant to ensure that such things would not take place. This worked sometimes and 
sometimes it did not. The emperor had to keep the military (es pecially the top brass) happy if he 
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 My forthcoming A Military History of Sasanian Iran will discuss these matters in greater detail.  
47
 The emperors could also be usurpers when for example a Caesar (junior emperor) rose against an Augustus 
(senior emperor) or Augustus attacked another Augustus. The victor then decided who the usurper was in the eyes 
of the law.  
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wanted to survive – foreign enemies and relig ious views were not considered as important. The late 
Roman emperors made this their prime concern with the result that they faced far fewer military  
revolts than their predecessors or the Persians. However, the favoritism of the top brass at the expense 
of the rank-and-file after the year 365 proved costly. It alienated the rank-and-file and population, 
which ult imately led to the fall o f West Rome.  
 It is clear that the rulers of both dictatorships48 suffered from the same basic weakness, which 
was their complete reliance on the security apparatus. The problem was that they had no alternative for 
this. The power of all dictators is based on the control of the security services . Both empires were 
therefore far more successful in their efforts to detect foreign threats than they were in detecting 
internal threats. The Persian šāhānšāhs had most to fear from their priests and nobles, while the Roman 
emperors had most to fear from their generals and co-emperors. In neither case could the rulers trust 
their security organs. And, when the measures put in place to control the internal security failed,  
the result was usually a civil war which the foreign enemies could then exploit. Th is was a vicious 
cycle. Ironically, both dictatorships had come into existence to end civil wars and to defend their 
countries against external enemies.  
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 Contrary to the popular view among the ultraconservative branch of the Classicists, the question of republic vs. 
dictatorship had relevance also in the late Roman context because there existed a viable alternative to  
the centralized Roman and Persian empires. The self-governing communities of Bacaudae bandits and barbarian 
kingdoms presented a clear alternative to those Romans who sought freedom from the oppression of the corrupt 
imperial machinery. The Bacaudae were Romans who chose to rise against the authorities so that they could form 
free communities of their own. Most of the Germanic societies elected the best leader to be their king and they 
could also overthrow those leaders who they considered weak. Some of these societies did not even have kings, 
the best example of this phenomenon being the Tervingi Goths who were ruled by the senat e of elders and an 
elected judge. It was because of this that the Baltha Alaric was able to become the King of the Visigoths only after 
he had proven himself as a commander. The hostility of the Romans against all of the barbarian tribes 
strengthened the position of all rulers among the tribes, but never to such an extent that the tribes would not have 
retained their traditional freedoms to choose rulers from the fourth to the sixth centuries. The best example of this 
is that the Ostrogoths chose Belisarius as their king.  
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Summary: 
The Eyes and Ears: The Sasanian and Roman Spies ca. AD 222-450 
 
The article The Eyes and Ears:  
1) Provides a brief analysis of the several parallel security organizations of the two superpowers of antiquity 
when they were still at their prime;  
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2) Discusses both internal and external security matters;  
3) Analyzes separately the military and civilian intelligence;  
4) Examines the role of the religious organizations, ‘heresies’ and security;  
5) Discusses briefly the ways in which the intelligence was obtained, analyzed, assessed and disseminated, and 
for what purpose;  
6) Provides an overview of the successes and failures and of the limits of intelligence;  
7) Demonstrates some similarities between modern and ancient practices.  
 
Keywords: Rome, Persia, Iran, intelligence gathering, espionage, scouting, police, secret service, military 
intelligence, internal security, external security, religion, religious police, justice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
